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Abstract—In a not so far future, private houses will be provided
with devices that can produce renewable energy, and this will give
the owners the chance of selling the unused energy to neighbors.
The fact that this selling will be based on peer to peer negotiation
(i.e., between single producers and single consumers), will make
this market deregulated. This situation could lead to advantages
for both producers, who will have an extra income for energy they
would not use, and consumers, who can buy cheaper energy than
the big companies’ one. However, this scenario is very complex
and dynamic, and without an appropriate management can lead
to odd situations.
This paper presents the agent-based modeling of an application
to manage the negotiation among different parties producing and
consuming energy. We will show that the feature of autonomy
of agents well suit the requirements of the proposed scenario.
Moreover, we will exploit game theory to define a strategy that
try to optimize energy production and supply costs by means of
negotiation and learning. By means of simulation of the different
parties we will show the effectiveness of the proposed approach;
the results show that applying our approach enables to reduce
the price of the energy and leads to an equilibrium between
expected and real prices.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing diffusion of solar panels and wind turbines
not only in public places but also in domestic environment
is driving the evolution of the energy market. In fact, while
today’s energy market is characterized by a centralized ap-
proach, i.e. few energy provider companies regulated by the
governments, in the future we expect that also small and home
energy producers can play an important role in this market.
On the one hand, this kind of producers rely on renewable
and clean sources; on the other hand, unused energy will not
wasted but sold to consumers.
This evolution towards deregulation should take into consid-
eration also Transmission and Distribution System Operators
(TSOs and DSOs), which might extend their services to
domestic users who rely on renewable energy devices in order
to let them participate as consumers and at the same time
producers, forming a new form of actor (the prosumer). This
scenario introduces new paradigms of price profiles [1] as well
as new negotiation procedures (e.g: by auctions [2]).
These changes can be thought in the context of the Smart
Grid, giving the possibility to ordinary consumers to retrieve
their needed energy from the neighbouring prosumers that can
supply both those domestic environments. This will create a
new kind of decentralized distribution net involving several
kinds of sellers with added dynamism and a finer time gran-
ularity for contracts’ stipulation.
The contribution of this paper is to propose a specific
agent oriented architecture in which software agents represent
different types of users: from the ordinary energy consumer
represented by a buyer agent, to the newly-introduced pro-
sumer agent, but also considering agents acting on behalf
of traditional big energy companies. Agents, thanks to their
autonomy, well suit the requirements of the depicted scenario.
Our proposal exploits also game theory, and in particular the
class of minority game was considered and adapted to this
project.
In the design of the proposed architecture we took into ac-
count several aspects, such as system heterogeneity, reliability,
scalability and security. We have simulated the architecture in
order to show the effectiveness of our approach, but we have
also implemented it in order to show the practical applicability
of the approach; in particular, we have exploited JADE1 as
agent platform to implement the architecture and to perform
our tests. Such tests have to deal with all the most important
aspects of the energy problem: balancing electricity demand,
forecasting supplies and also negotiation with specific market
adaptation strategies. Readers interested in the he metering
aspect, can find in [3] the discussion of an hybrid scenario
with a real domestic environment with multiple other agent
simulated nodes.
The paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the
related literature (Section II), the models and agents used are
presented (Section III). In Section IV the market adaptation
algorithm will be presented, showing simulations and results
in Section V. Final remarks and future work possibilities end
the paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Interesting applications featuring agents in the energy mar-
ket can be found in [4]. In this latter work, Ramchurn et al.
describe a decentralized agent approach for avoiding energy
consumption peaks, achieving less polluting emissions and
average lower contract prices using all the features a Smart
Meter can offer. Vytelingum et al. in [5] used the game
1http://jade.tilab.com/
theoretic approach in order to find the Nash equilibrium to
determine whenever an agent inserted in a Smart Grid is
supposed to use a previously stored amount of energy or obtain
electricity from the grid. We have to specify that our approach
relies on the fact the buffering and/or storing electric energy
is difficult and expensive to achieve and hardly fits the short-
term approach to the market that (especially for wind power)
is proven to be more effective [6].
Definitions and notations for the game theoretic concepts
commonly used later in this work can be found in [7] and [8].
For deeper knowledge investigation on repeated games, see
for instance [9], while the reference example of minority
game used in solving the presented problem has been already
investigated in [10], [11]. The minority game features several
specifications and example scenarios, however the scenario
presented by the previously cited authors is the one that we
refer with the term “minority game”. More specific notions
of game theoretic approaches adopted by agents can be found
in [12].
III. MODELLING OF AGENTS
In this section we give a complete overview of the agents
set required in the energy trading scenario proposed describing
the kind of agents involved in the energy market with a
in depth explanation of the most important steps of their
behaviors. In addition to that, a clear distinction of how an
agent is supposed to act in an hypothetical real environment
and what actually performs the simulation software, needs to
be highlighted in order to obtain a better understanding of the
problem. The platform used for this application has different
kinds of agents according to their roles. Main and auxiliary
agents are present, as explained as follows:
Buyers are energy consumers and they usually outnumber
the sellers; they do not produce energy so they are searching
for obtaining their electricity demand supplied by stipulating
contracts related to a specific time interval. Each market day
is divided into several time intervals and for each one every
buyer has to decide in advance who is going to be its energy
supplier for the next time interval. In the developed software,
a balancer agent controls the amount of energy exchanged in
the negotiation process (the details are explained later in this
section). Buyers can predict how much energy they need for
the following time interval. This can be obtained by reading
previous electric measurement and by applying an energy con-
sumption forecasting algorithm. It is important to perform this
forecast before any negotiation, so that the buyer can choose
the most suitable seller according to the energy availability
of the suppliers. A really effective forecasting algorithm that
fits our short-term paradigm is thoroughly described in [13]
and it is based on an adaptive two-stage hybrid network with
a Self-Organized Map (SOM). Every buyer is in competition
with other buyers: each consumer has the goal to stipulate the
cheapest contracts following two different actions:
1) Attending an auction handled by prosumers, constituted
by an iterative process of sending sealed bids.
2) Contacting a big energy producer (Genco) for obtain-
ing the cheapest short-term contract before the Genco
reaches a congestion threshold of its production lines.
Prosumers produce and consume energy; even if there are
more prosumers then gencos, they produce a smaller quantity
of electricity compared to traditional supplier. Their production
derives from the use of solar panels or wind turbine and if
the amount of produced energy is higher than their domestic
needs, they may decide to sell the surplus of electricity to
other neighbors (buyers). Prosumers have also information
about weather conditions in order to have a forecast on the
amount of energy that will be produced (an example on how
to automatically retrieve weather forecasting information is by
using existing web services).
A buyer can stipulate a contract with a prosumer after
winning an auction round, based on sealed bids; a prosumer
can sell its energy to more than one buyer, while, for
simplicity’s sake, we assume that one buyer buys energy
from one prosumer only. For a prosumer once the investment
in a small-scale energy production plant based on renewables
is realized, any positive amount derived by selling energy
contributes to the investment return. Therefore in order to
be attractive, prosumers’ starting prices can be considered
substantially lower than Gencos’ initial contract prices.
Prosumers communicate to buyers an initial starting price that
is influenced by contracts with DSOs/TSOs and a random
cost due to the devices used to produce electricity (e.g.,
maintenance costs). The energy produced by a prosumer has
to be sold and cannot be stored or buffered. Every prosumer
is in direct competition with other sellers: they have to
propose an appealing starting price and make an intelligent
use of refusing bids in order to rise the price and, at the same
time, avoid pushing buyers in contacting other sellers.
Gencos are big energy generating companies. They have a the-
oretically infinite amount of energy supply, but sold at a fixed
price, so there is no auction negotiation and every contract can
be stipulated much faster compared to the prosumers’ auction
system.
However their prices are higher than prosumers’ starting price
and they depend on TSO/DSO contracts, raw material prices
and (most important in our scenario) threshold exceeding
costs. This aspect is thoroughly explained in the following
paragraph and represent a modeling choice to prevent over-
loading production lines as well as avoiding concentrating a
huge number of consumers for a single big producer. A Genco
receives a request from a buyer; then it just calculates the price
according to the above-explained variables and communicates
the final price back to the buyer.
Gencos’ threshold system. A key point is how much
energy a generating company can produce without having
to buy a quantity on the market (e.g., a foreign and more
expensive market) or switching to more polluting production
lines. Thus we assume that every Genco has a supply
threshold, and once reached, the Genco has to buy energy
abroad (the energy production of that seller is under stress).
So the energy cost can be calculated as follows:
Cu =
{
Costenergy if below supply threshold
Costenergy + (EC ×A) if above supply threshold
where Cu is a single energy unit cost, EC > 1 is an external
cost constant and A > 0 is the number of energy units above
the threshold.
In addition, surpassing the threshold might also be harmful
for the environment since more polluting plants might be
started (e.g., oil based). Asking the Genco for contracts when
this threshold is already surpassed leads to more expensive
contract prices. Those prices rise as we get further from the
specified threshold. This particular pricing strategy already
introduced in [3] is perfectly compliant with the findings
of other researches: from the already cited [4] and [5] to
older studies led by Brazier et al. [14]. These researches
do not provide the same formulation, however the common
conclusion is that satisfying large number of demands will
stress energy production lines introducing additional costs for
the final user.
A. Balacing aspects
Other auxiliary agents, not directly involved in the negotia-
tion process are represented by the Balancer and the Time
agents. While the latter’s only duty is to provide a time
reference for synchronizing processes, the Balancer agent is
responsible for the demand/supply balancing aspects: it acts
in the very first step of the negotiation round by retrieving the
single demand of every consumer and the production forecasts
of the prosumers.
Having a clear understanding of the balancing needs of the
grid is essential. In fact, recent studies [15] have shown how
the nationwide energy dispatch will react to the introduction
of renewable sources; in particular, the energy production
derived from traditional sources will decrease: in the U.S.A
a future projection of four summer days in year 2030 is
depicted in Fig. 1 and shows two scenarios, with and without
solar penetration and how their percentage of produced energy
compares to traditional sources. The demand satisfied by the
total production from all sources remains constant in these two
scenarios; however, in (b) we can see that the introduction of
PV and CSPs (respectively PhotoVoltaic and Concentrating
Solar Power plants) will cause decreasing in production by all
the traditional suppliers.
The data in Fig. 1 refers to GridView2 production cost
model, with hourly load, solar and wind projections for 2030
based on 2006 information to maintain data correlation. On
a separate note, it is important to point out that, in Fig. 1,
solar plants have production peaks during central hours of the
examined days.
In our model we are clearly dealing with the (b) situation
when it comes to balancing issues. Several mathematical
models are presented, but most of them are different way to set
to zero the algebraical sum between demand on one side and
2http://www.abb.com/industries/
Fig. 1. U.S. Nationwide energy dispatch without (a) and with (b) renewable
contributions. Source [15]
supply to the other side [16], taking into account that rising of
renewables will be balanced by a decreasing of the traditional
energy production.
Out simplified mathematical approach is explained in the
following.
Given:
Gcx as Genco num.x with SGcx being the supplies provided
by that specific Genco
Ng number of Gencos
Pry as Prosumer num.y with SP ry being the supplies
provided by that specific Prosumer
Mp number of Prosumers
D total demand of the observed Area and Time Interval with
DCtk the demand of the Kth buyer
Ti time interval(s)
Ct number of consumers in the observed Area and Time
Interval
The ability of producing an amount of energy is influenced
mostly by the market of raw materials for the Genco produc-
tion line, while the prosumers have to deal with local weather.
Producing more than the quantity that they are supposed to
supply is risky for the sellers since we assume the absence
of buffering or storing of surplus energy. Moreover, we have
to take into account all the previous considerations regarding
traditional suppliers versus PVs and CSPs.
Demand D is calculated by a specific algorithm of demand
forecasting, but no matter which kind of statistics we are going
to use in order to solve that, we have to specify that the demand
refers to a pre-determined interval of time. That is because we
are trying to deal with the short term market paradigm in order
to avoid overloading electric lines as a result of bad long term
forecasting or unoptimized distribution.
Obviously D is just the sum of all the demands (at a certain
time) needed for all the consumers in the area. It has to satisfy










Equation 1 does not take into account unavoidable leaks and
calculating errors. On the other side, if the supply and demand
forecasting are efficient and precise enough, we can rely on
an easy implementation model for simulations. Equation 1 is
quite straightforward in its meaning: the sum between the two
production sources (Gencos and prosumers) should be equal
to the total consumer demand. Also, from previous sections,
we know that dealing with a fixed demand will cause the other
two elements to change accordingly and it is more likely to
see in the future an increment on the prosumers’ supplies that
will be balanced by a decrease of gencos’ production.
B. Agents behaviour
Other agents used for simulation purposes are represented
by an Agent Creator who is able to dispatch the other agents
in the respective areas [17] and an exception handler agent
used to increase performances, which has been implemented
during scalability and reliability tests [18].
In order to provide a clearer picture on how the contract
negotiation and the adaptation to the energy market has been
modelled for our test simulations, this section presents an
overview of the behavior that agents are following during a
single negotiating round. Some auxiliary agents have been left
out, due to their simple tasks that does not require further
explanations, while the Balancer and Prosumer’s behavioural
steps are shown in Fig. 2. Also the Genco has been left out due
to the simplicity of its behavior compared to buyers/prosumers
auction system and due to the fact that its threshold pricing
model has already been thoroughly explained.
The steps in Fig. 2 provide a complete picture on what
happens during a single negotiating round. Some behaviors
are common, such as the discovery of agents according to the
role they have: this is obtained using a feature of the chosen
agent platform. In fact, JADE has a distributed Directory
Facilitator (DF) in which any agent can register itself to be
then found by other agents distributed elsewhere, therefore
the DF acts as a yellow pages service. The registration itself
is not shown in Fig. 2, since just the steps in the JADE main
behavioural method (i.e: action()) is shown. Registration in
the DF is done just once in the initializing method, while
the search and discovery is done in every negotiating interval.
This latter choice obviously introduces more computational
load, however it is completely justified for having a dynamic
architecture in which the number of total peers is constantly
changing. An introduction of a new seller, for instance, will
be known to the other agents starting from the following time
interval.
Initial steps indicate the retrieving of web services for both
consumers and sellers. The goal of the former is to obtain the
local temperature to know in advance if an air conditioning
system will be active: thinking about a function for describing
the bound between temperature and the consequent energy
consumption, we can roughly describe a V shaped function
in which to the lowest amount of energy used corresponds
to average temperature from 19 to 21 degrees, while we
have consumptions peak as far as we move from this point
(meaning that is either too hot or too cold). An agent can
retrieve temperature values using appropriate web services and
a prosumer does the same for obtaining weather information
for forecasting its production (e.g: wind direction and strength
in case it has a micro generation through wind turbine).
Still regarding the buyer’s initial steps, a buyer can retrieve
informations about previous consumptions and also on going
tariffs by interacting with a Smart Meter (a new generation
electric energy consumption reader). This has been previously
and successfully tested with this presented implementation [3].
Concerning the buyer’s market strategy and adaptation to
the dynamics of the short term electricity contracts, in Fig.2,
we can see how the agents’ decisions are taken in different
steps: as soon as they have received the notification from
the balancer to start the negotiation, they have to first decide
to contact a prosumer or a Genco. This is done by using
a minority game derived algorithm (see Section IV), taking
into account the limited prosumers supplies compared to the
traditional Gencos. In case of the choice of contacting a
prosumer, also the amount of stakes and maximum number
of sent bids follow the adaptation algorithm: the goal is to
avoid wasting time in sending multiple bids while Gencos are
exceeding their production threshold. The market adaptation
deals with the last step: every consumer has to evaluate if his
budget expectations have been respected, changing how to rise
their bids accordingly to the previous negotiation outcomes.
This latter step is obtained by an added fuzzy logic block.
IV. MODELLING OF AGENT STRATEGIES
The buyer agents in our architecture are supposed to chose
between contacting a Genco or a prosumer when they first
receive a notification for beginning the negotiation. This two
path approach has to lead to the cheapest energy contract
possible for the buyer that acts on behalf of an human user
and therefore has to simulate his/her rationality. Having a
restricted set of actions as initial choices and a final outcome
to be evaluated suggests us to seek in the game theoretic
literature for a similar scenario that we can apply for solving
our problem. In particular in the class of minority games we
can think about a scenario in which two actions are initially
possible and the outcome of this game depends on the actions
of the other players, provided that each participant does not
know in advance how his competitors will act. In these games,
the players who have chosen the action taken by the minority
of the total participants are rewarded with higher payoffs.
Furthermore, since the energy market model proposed repeats
itself in several negotiating round we should also take into
account the game theoretic notion of repeated game. We are
now presenting an already solved basic game scenario and
on a second step we will show how to extend it to provide
our buyer agents with an adapting strategy for the presented
market model.
Fig. 2. Steps in the behavior of the main agents involved in the negotiation and balancing aspects.
A. El Farol Bar game
“El Farol Bar” is an existing bar situated in New Mexico
(USA). Every Thursday night it delivers discounted drink
prices, becoming really appetizing for the local potential
costumers, making obvious why every person living near the
bar, wants to go there on that particular night. The bar has
been used to model the El Farol Bar minority game [10],
[11]. Given N as the population in the nearby area, and a
threshold T representing the bar capacity for hosting people,
for a participant point of view the night can considered as
enjoyable if the number n (≤ N) of participants during a
particular Thursday is below the threshold T (win situation).
Otherwise, it is better for the single person to remain at home
(lose situation, the pub is too crowded). The payoff matrix
of the above scenario is presented in Table I: an high(low)
payoff is retrieved if the player goes to bar with a number
of people below(above) the threshold, while it is supposed
an unconditioned average payoff in case he decide to stay at
home.
Switching back to our problem, the two possible initial
choices of action are still present in our energy related
scenario: if every agent contacts a Genco, it will result in
overloading the production lines of these big energy producers,
causing them to provision in more expensive markets with high
TABLE I
EL FAROL BAR PAYOFF MATRIX
Action Crowded Bar not Crowded Bar
Attend L H
Do not Attend M M
With payoff score H > M > L, with M unconditioned.
prices for the end-user and environmental issues too. Likewise,
if every agent contacts (or tries to do so) the same restricted
set of prosumers, only a few number of participant gets a nice
deal, due to the fact that a prosumer can deliver a little amount
of energy, especially compared to a Genco.
In our problem, we can adapt the different degrees of payoff
of the bar scenario with the difference between what a single
agent expected to spend and what it actually spends at the end
of the negotiation interval (budget evaluation).
B. Solutions for the minority game approach
A simple way to find an equilibrium for the El Farol Bar
game has been proposed originally in [10]. We begin by
illustrating this first intuitive approach.
According to the demonstration in [10] there is a unique
TABLE II
INITIAL STATE 1 (TAB1)
Action P. has supplies P. has no supplies
Contact Pros. See TAB3 (+2 Ip) See TAB2 (0 Ip)
Contact Genco See TAB4 (+1 Ip) See TAB4 (+1 Ip)
symmetrical mixed strategy solution:
M − L








Where p is the probability to go at the bar and M , L and H
the payoffs as shown in Table I.
Following studies (i.e., [11]) have shown other solutions,
which are classified according to fairness and efficiency
measures. Here we propose a variant meeting the fairness
requirement and having an average efficiency, since we do
not want to compromise the fairness of the market (it would
be illegal to give privileges to some buyers, penalizing others).
Using equation 2, we can see that for each participant we
have a given probability that can be used to decide whether it
is advisable to attend the discounted price night. Repeating the
game we can see that every agent sooner or later will attend
the bar and that most of the times, the pub will not be so
crowded.
When trying to apply the solution shown in the equation 2
to our energy problem, we map some variables as follows:
T for the ratio between the amounts of energy produced by
Prosumers over the total production, N is the total number of
buyer agents and M , H and L are intervals defined according
to the expected/actual money spent. A difference between the
bar game and our energy market is that in the bar game if a
number m of people are attending the bar with m > T then
m players are losing. In our problem just T −m people are
actually going to retrieve a low payoff.
This initial model still lacks of influential variables like
time constraints and limited prosumers’ supplies, implying
the necessity of adding further stages to our game. We now
present an approach in which several tables represent different
payoff matrices for all the stages forming the game. This
new methodology that mixes the minority game approach
with a stochastic game (every payoff table refers to a specific
participant’s state) is used in order to model the complexity
of the energy problem.
The main idea behind the adaptation of the game we propose
is presented more formally in Fig. 3. It is an infinite game split
into finite rounds. The decision each agent takes at every state
is compactly represented in the following payoff tables.
Tables II and III are called initial state tables while Ta-
bles IV and V are defined as final state tables. The difference
is that only Tables IV and V show an ending of the negotiation,
represented by the letters H , M or L as the payoff entity inside
those cells.
Every buyer starts by taking a decision in the first table
(referring to an element of the state space M). The balancer
agent is the entity that knows how much energy can be
Let I be a set of agents representing the consumers;
P be the set of prosumers, while G represents the Gencos;
Players ∈ I move through different tables shaping the finite state
space M = {m0, m1, m2, m3}.
m0: initial state in which the agent i ∈ I decides who is going to
first contact. It can be a Genco or a specific Prosumer P0 ∈ P.
m1: second state in which i decides who will be contacted next,
provided that D(i) > S(P0) with D being the consumer demand
and S is the seller’s supply capacity.
m2: here i decides if it is convenient to bid a previously contacted
prosumer Px ∈ P or abort the negotiation, given D(i) ≤ S(P0).
m3: i decides to accept or not the offer of a Genco Gx ∈ G.
Therefore each player (agent) i ∈ I can perform an action inside
the set(s):
Ai(m0) = Ai(m1) = {Contact Genco, Contact Prosumer};
Ai(m2) = {Place bid, Abort Negotiation};
Ai(m3) = {Accept offer, Refuse offer}.
The probability P to move from the current state mx to next
state (my) after performing a specific action a ∈ A, written
P (mx,a,my) is described in Tables II, III, IV and V with their
assigned payoff chains.
Fig. 3. Game formalization.
TABLE III
INITIAL STATE 2 (TAB2)
Action P. has supplies P. has no supplies
Contact other P. See TAB3 (+2 Ip) See TAB2 (0 Ip)
Contact Genco See TAB4 (+1 Ip) See TAB4 (+1 Ip)
produced by all the prosumers and by using this information
it can calculate the number of buyers that could be served by
prosumers; this number can be related to the threshold T in the
El Farol game. According to that threshold we can calculate
the probability to contact prosumers instead of a Genco in
this stage of the negotiation (quite similar to how it was
possible to solve the “El Farol Bar” dilemma using the unique
mixed strategy solution). However, at this moment we do not
have a clear vision of future payoffs, but we can assign to
those initial tables a certain amount of fictional points that we
call “Intermediate points” (Ips). Those Ips represent the chain
of payoffs for the stochastic game approach: assuming that
every action taken by a participant agent is time consuming,
TABLE IV
FINAL STATE 3 (TAB3)
Action Pros. accepts Pros. refuses
Place bid H Stay in TAB3 (-1 Ip)
Abort negotiation See TAB2 See TAB2 (0 Ip)
TABLE V
FINAL STATE 4 (TAB4)
Action Genco above T. Genco below T.
Accept genco’s offer M L
Refuse genco’s offer See TAB2 (-1 Ip) See TAB2 (-1 Ip)
decreasing Ips simulates time flow as well as a risk increase
that the participating agent should be aware of. Risk awareness
in auction bidding systems has already been studied [19];
although the concept of risk is elaborated in a different kind
of market model, a risk-aware agent better simulates how a
human user would act. On the other side, higher Ips increase
the chance to have a satisfactory game result (H or M final
payoff). In this way the buyer is redirected to other tables
until it reaches a final cell: doing so the number of Ips can
increase in case it is a lucky choice (contacting a prosumer
that for sure has enough supplies) or decrease in the opposite
scenario. In the initial state tables the buyer is redirected to
other tables according to a previously calculated value that is
related to the amount of energy all prosumers can produce.
In the final state tables the algorithm is different: in order to
simulate the importance of the time variable, lower Ip values
mean that the buyer has been travelling around different tables
for such a long time and chances to find a suitable seller or
even a Genco that has not overtaken its threshold will be
scarce. That is because in the ending tables negative values
are present. When the Ip value is very small (<< 0) then the
agent is forced to get a contract with a Genco in order to avoid
wasting other time (and consequently other money).
At the end of each round, each buyer agent evaluates
its outcome. Above we said that the difference between the
expected money spent and the actual money spent can point
out who are the winners and who are the losers, however
ending a negotiation in a H(L) payoff cell of a matrix not
always ensure a win(lose) situation: that is because the market
dynamics (being bounded by swinging prices of raw energy
production materials) leads to constant changes in energy
minimum prices. Therefore obtaining an higher contract price
compared to the pre-determined budget can happen even if
the agent ended its cycle with an H payoff: in this case it
just means that the agent was expecting an unrealistically low
contract price. The same considerations have to be done in the
opposite scenario of having an L payoff for a cheap contract.
This implies the addition of a fuzzy logic block able to adjust
the expected budget and the amount for the single bids (in case
of a prosumer auction). The further we are from the centre of
the fuzzy logic function, the stronger will be the reaction of
the agent (either to increase or decrease stakes and/or expected
budget), following simple and linear trends.
V. SIMULATION
In such complex and dynamic scenario, a simulation is
needed to prove if the designed strategy could be used by
agents to negotiate in the market, thus obtaining cheaper
contract prices. In particular, we use 5 consumers, 3 prosumers
and 2 Gencos within a 10 round negotiation runs to test the
JADE agents implementation. This simpler scenario allows
us to evaluate the game based algorithm with different price
scales using agents. The restricted number of agents, does not
compromise the purpose of the test: this is because the kind
of market modelled is more heavily influenced by the ratio
between total demand and prosumers’ supplies rather than the
number of agents per se.
Several parameters can be adjusted influencing the agent
decision, namely: (1) number of Ips used as threshold in order
to redirect the participant from one final table to the other;
(2) difference between starting prices for the two kinds of
sellers; (3) threshold switching values in the fuzzy logic block;
(4) best way to assign values to H , M and L final payoffs;
(5) price dynamics from one round to the other; (6) Gencos’
price penalties for exceeding thresholds; (7) probability for a
prosumer to become more expensive than a Genco; and (8)
accuracy about energy supply and demand forecasting that
might not be 100% correct.
The best way to give a precise value to these parameters is
to study an analytical formulation in which we can combine
all the other known values (e.g., number of participants and
amount of demands and supplies) in order to retrieve the
unknown constants. However, due to the complexity and dy-
namics of the proposed model, we decided to use a numerical
approach by trying several value combinations of every input
variables of the algorithm.
At the end of each round, the buyer agent calculates
the average expecting budget and the average money spent,
assigning to each round number those other two values (e.g.,
round #, Paid Price, Expected Price).
In order to have a clearer idea of the efficiency and precision
of the strategy, we show the difference between applying
the presented algorithm or use a baseline set of actions.
In the latter scenario, every buyer will contact a prosumer
straightaway, since their starting prices are lower, becoming
more appetizing to a rational agent. In addition, after signing a
contract, the participant does not adjust any strategy parameter.
We obtain the results shown in Fig. 4, under the following
conditions: (1) intersection between average starting prices
of the sellers should not exceed 33%; (2) slow and not
exaggerated price swings between each round; (3) significant
price penalties for exceeding Gencos’ threshold; (4) the higher
the error percentage between the forecast demand values and
the actual requested values (negative error), the better becomes
the improvement between using the presented algorithm com-
pared to the baseline scenario; positive errors may worsen
participant performances; and (5) very fast reaction to follow
the expected price. The conditions (1) and (3) force the gap
between the prices to be wide enough to justify the minority
game approach, while (2) and (5) deal with the difficulty
of the algorithm in finding equilibria in exaggerate dynamic
scenarios. While (4) is straightforward.
The results of the simulation, as depicted in Fig. 4, show
that expected prices follow the previous peak of paid prices.
It is important to highlight that we are also trying to simulate
the impact of swinging prices due to raw material prices
fluctuations and/or payback costs for solar panels or wind
turbines for prosumers. Even if those swings are not exagger-
ated due to high granularity for stipulating contracts, they are
indeed an additional challenge to further prove the reaching of
certain equilibrium scenarios. Proving the effectiveness of the
described game is a challenging open question that we tried
to answer with this simulation test.
Fig. 4. Prices varying during 10 rounds with and without the presented
algorithm (JADE output). Prices have to be intended as price per energy unit.
In the simulation, the expected price starts from 0 in the first
round, reaching a convergence during the 8th round. Starting
from that point, it becomes visible how expected and obtained
prices of agents that follows the minority and stochastic ap-
proach (represented by the two continuous lines in Fig. 4), will
constantly chase each other. Economically speaking, it means
that in earlier rounds a buyer agent adopting the algorithm
with the described strategies is likely to pay equally or slightly
more than an agent following other strategies. However, if
we consider a sufficiently large number of rounds, the saving
compared to agents following the baseline behaviour (Fig. 4,
the dotted line) is obtained more frequently, with significant
lowest peaks during the most expensive period for buying
energy.
The test was executed having a constant numbers of agents,
although sellers’ supply capacity was subject to randomized
swings from one round to the other. Therefore, changing
sellers’ number does not drastically affect the presented re-
sults, provided that this number does not exaggeratedly and
unrealistically change in a short period of time. In a more
complex scenario in which sellers adopt strategies according
to the economic background, the presence of different market
competitors will determine an additional factor that needs to
be further investigated in order to provide a more realistic
model.
Computationally wise, the complexity of the presented
algorithm is variable but does not appear to represent a
problem. While the balancer agent has the duty to solve
equation 2, buyer agents just have to solve an iterated amount
of conditional instruction and comparing variables (e.g: if
current Ip value is greater than the threshold value then execute
action A, otherwise jump to action B). The fuzzy logic block
is just composed of a mixed set of linear functions and it is
executed just once at the end of the negotiating round. On
a separate note about the architecture itself, further tests and
improvements on performances (also in a distributed net) are
considered in [18].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented an agent-based architecture
for deregulated energy market. We discussed aspects like
balancing, pricing, negotiation and adaptation, which were
taken into consideration for modelling, implementing and
simulating the architecture. Fig. 4 shows that the adoption
of an adaptive strategy produce better results when certain
conditions are satisfied. Moreover, the expected prices, starting
from very low values, tend to reach an equilibrated amount that
represents the cheapest alternative in almost all the examined
negotiation rounds. Agents that always try to win prosumers’
auctions may have some chance to win during the initial
rounds, but still the algorithm provided tries to establish a
Nash equilibrium nonetheless; once the prices are balanced,
chances to obtain the best bargain are going to be sporadic
for those agents.
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